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Foreword 
 
This paper was presented at ICRIER’s Conference on “India and China’s Role in 
International Trade and Finance and Global Economic Governance” jointly organised 
with Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
in December 2007. It is being published shortly in a volume titled “Emerging Giants: 
China and India in the World Economy” edited by Barry Eichengreen, Poonam Gupta 
and Rajiv Kumar. We are brining this out as a working paper to promote a discussion 
on the important issues discussed by the author. 
 
This paper examines why the share of consumption in China’s GDP has been low and 
that of investment high. It finds that the low real cost of capital in China has been an 
important factor. If China is to rebalance its growth stance in the future towards 
relying more on domestic consumption and less on exports and investment for 
sustaining GDP growth, the two necessary conditions are carrying forward, its 
banking sector reforms and a further developing its financial markets. These finding 
have a direct relevance for India’s policy making as well. It is hoped that the Working 
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Abstract 
 
This paper uses the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model to investigate why 
China’s consumption has been low and investment high. It finds that the low cost of 
capital has been quantitatively an important factor. Theory predicts that the price of 
capital may have been significantly distorted in the 1990s and 2000s. The distortion 
could have been caused by nonperforming loans, borrowing constraints, and 
uncertainty over changes in government guidance in bank lending. In one form or the 
other, these distortions have implied significant transfers from households to firms. If 
China is to rebalance growth towards relying more on consumption and less on 
exports and investment, banking sector reforms and financial market development 
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Deconstructing China’s and India’s Growth: the 




1.  Introduction 
 
Much has been written about China and India’s recent economic performance. And 
why not? With a third of the world’s population and nearly two-thirds of the world’s 
poor, the sustained high growth of these two countries over the last decade is 
unprecedented. How these two countries have managed to sustain such high growth 
rates clearly hold important lessons for both development theorists and practitioners.  
 
This paper looks into the role played by the financial sector in the growth process of 
China and India. The role of the financial sector in growth is an old topic and, by and 
large, the theoretical literature considers well-developed financial intermediation, by 
matching investors with savers better, to be an essential driver of growth (beginning 
with Schumpeter, 1911).
1 The most well known formalization is the McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis that government restriction by repressing financial development adversely 
affects both the level of investment and productivity and thus overall growth. This 
argument has been reformalized in various ways (Bencivenga and Smith (1991); 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990); Pagano (1997)), but the overall theme is the same. 
Another strand of this literature emphasizes the role played by financial development 
in reducing the cost of external financing by firms. Informational asymmetry or 
transaction costs make internal financing cheaper than external funds (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). Financial development reduces these informational asymmetries and 
transactions costs.  
 
The empirical side of the literature is, however, not that persuasive. Lack of sufficient 
data and the inability to measure the nature of financial development with available 
measurable indicators has been a major drawback. However, there is some (and 
growing) evidence to suggest that at least when variations across countries are 
considered then financial development appears to play a role in economic 
development (Beck et. al (2000), King and Levine (1993), and Rajan and Zingales 
(1998)). Subject to a number of qualifications, this literature finds that financial 
systems directly influence growth and that well-functioning systems need stable 
macroeconomic policies, strong legal and information systems, a contestable 
environment, and regulations that empower markets through better information 
disclosure and increases access to markets (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2008).  
 
Supporting country-specific evidence is far harder to find as variations in financial 
development and institutions is typically not very dramatic for the short time period 
data is typically available in most countries (Athukorala and Sen (2002)). Indeed in 
the case of China, Aziz and Duenwald (2003) fail to find any evidence that financial 
development had helped growth along the channels considered important in the 
                                                 
1  This view is not unchallenged. Economic development could lead to higher demand for financial 
services that shows up as positive correlation between the two variables or even that financial sector 
development could impede growth if it leads to higher volatility discouraging risk-averse investors 
(Mauro, 1995 and Singh, 1997).    2
theoretical literature using province-level panel data. In fact, they find that most of the 
increased financial intermediation, proxied by higher bank deposit and lending, was 
used to finance the less efficient public sector that did not play a major positive role in 
China’s growth over the period 1978-2002. However, they argue that keeping such 
enterprises afloat was important for preserving social stability, which may have 
indirectly helped growth. Bank loans were used to fund social transfers to the vast 
public sector employees that could not be easily re-employed in the fast growing 
private sector. By doing so, social stability was maintained that helped investment and 
growth.  However, using later (survey) data, Aziz and Li (2007) find that financial 
constraints impeded employment growth of small and medium-scale firms, i.e., 
constraints on external finances affected working capital that is typically used for 
current expenses such as wages, although investment, which was made largely from 
internal savings, was not affected. Thus, while overall growth may not have been 
affected by the lack of financial sector development, job creation was slowed.  The 
lack of access to external finances also appears to have played a large role in 
impeding the growth of firms in other countries (Ayyagari et al. 2005 and Beck et al., 
2004).  
 
In the context of India, where the financial system is usually considered to be more 
developed than that in China and data is more easily available, there is some evidence 
that financial sector development (both in terms of access and in terms of instruments 
available) have had a positive impact on growth (Oura and Kohli, 2008 and Allen et 
al., 2006). Much of the evidence supporting the positive role of financial development 
in India rests on the negative impact financing constraints have on firm growth and 
the extent to which financial sector reforms have eased these constraints.  Indeed, 
Ghosh (2006) using data from 1995-2004 for 1141 firms finds that for both small and 
large sized firms, financial liberalization in India in the post-1992 period eased firms’ 
financial constraint in funding investment.  
 
This paper revisits this issue as the connection between growth and financial 
development in fast changing economies like China’s and India’s could be more deep 
rooted and complicated than what can be captured by simply looking at the 
relationship between available proxies for financial development and that for 
economic growth. The basic argument being that links between financial development 
and growth depend crucially on the nature of financial institutions and financial 
policies pursued in a country that are well captured available proxies, such as deposit 
or credit growth. Instead, financial policies and institutions change the way 
investment and saving decisions are made, such that looking at these decisions 
explicitly may provide a better sense of the connection between the financial sector 
and economic performance of a country.    
 
To explore this idea within a reasonably parsimonious framework, this paper turns to 
a seemingly unrelated strand in the literature, namely business cycle accounting 
(BCA). The framework used here borrows from what has come to be known as 
business cycle accounting (BCA) following Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007). 
Early examples of this approach are the studies by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 
(2002a and 2002b); Hayashi and Prescott (2002); Bergeoing and others (2002); and 
Kydland and Zarazaga (2002) who analyzed the Great Depression and protracted 
downturns in the Japanese, Mexican, Chilean, and the Argentine economies in the 
1980s and 1990s.  
   3
In broad terms, the BCA literature extends the conventional one-sector Solow growth 
model to include various types of market imperfections or wedges that distort 
decisions of agents operating in otherwise competitive markets. Typically, these 
wedges look like simple productivity shocks, time-varying labor income and capital 
income taxes, and government consumption and are labeled as efficiency, labor, 
investment, and government wedges. However, it turns out that equilibria of a large 
variety of commonly-used paradigms, including those that depend on asymmetric 
information, financial distortions, and heterogeneity across firms and households, are 
found to be equivalent to those of a one-sector Solow growth model with one or more 
of these wedges. Thus, these wedges, despite their apparent simplicity, can reflect rich 
and complex economic environments and contractual arrangements among firms and 
households.  
 
Data is then used to estimate the size and temporal behavior of these wedges based on 
explicitly derived equilibrium conditions of a neoclassical growth model embedded 
with simple market frictions. The estimated frictions act as a guide for the types of 
market distortions that are quantitatively more important than others in explaining the 
comovement of output, labor, consumption, and investment in the actual data. The 
quantitatively more important wedges are then mapped into more complex market 
environments that could be plausible explanations for such frictions. Once such a 
mapping is achieved, one has a framework to assess which structural features or 
institutional arrangement, policies, or reforms are relatively more important than 
others in explaining growth. 
 
In deriving the wedges, preference and technology parameters in this paper were 
chosen to be as close as possible to the ones that are typically assumed in the literature 
for most countries. This is in contrast to some studies such as by Fehr, Jokisch, and 
Kotlikoff (2005) who choose preference parameters to match Chinese savings 
behavior or Bosworth and Collins, 2007 and Bosworth, Collins, Virmani (), who 
choose technology parameters to match income shares of capital and labor in China 
and India. Fine tuning these parameters to better match the data is unappealing since it 
leaves little room for policy changes or reforms to play any role. Put differently, to a 
large extent these studies appear to be saying that the Chinese and Indian economies 
have performed the way they have because to a large extent households and firms in 
these two countries are Chinese and Indian.  Instead by assuming that Chinese and 
Indian households have the same preferences and technological choices (and as do 
agents in other countries), differences in economic performance are entirely due to 
differences in market structures, policies, and efficiency. The approach in this paper is 
to find China- and India-specific market distortions that may have constrained 
optimizing households and firms to behave is such a way that the comovements of 
growth, consumption, and investment in the model economies mimic those in the 
China and India data.    
 
The results from this exercise suggest that in both China and India distortions to the 
cost of capital may be quantitatively important in understanding their growth 
experience. In China, the cost of capital has been persistently lower than what would 
have been the case in a standard one-sector Solow growth model without any 
frictions—the optimal cost of capital. In India, the cost of capital has been persistently 
higher than this optimal level. In China, the high growth, which has been largely 
driven by rapid investment, coincides with a negative wedge between the actual and 
optimal cost of capital, while in India, where growth has also been driven by   4
investment, the wedge, while still high and positive has declined. In the case of China, 
the suppression of the cost of capital below its optimal level is a reflection of 
continued financial repression that has implied a large implicit tax on household’s 
investment income. In India, the falling wedge is a sign of reduced financial 
repression following the reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s.   
 
The paper puts forward a number of reasons why the cost of capital has been distorted 
in the two countries. In China, it has been the use of the banking sector to provide 
cheap financing by tolerating a large level of nonperforming loans in the past and at 
present the large retention of corporate profits because of weak corporate governance 
(especially by the state) and the need for firms to self-insure themselves against state-
directed credit constraints imposed on bank lending at present. In India, the cost of 
outside financing has been high because of lack of competition until recently, high 
retention of resources by the state (directly and indirectly) to finance fiscal deficits, 
and directed lending. As reforms have increased competition and financial repression 
has declined as the state has reduced deficits, the cost of capital has also fallen.    
 
In terms of policies, reducing financial distortions in both countries turn out to be key. 
In China, allowing the cost of capital to reflect the true resource costs is important not 
only to reduce investment, but also to raise household income and consumption, both 
of which are needed if China is to sustain its high growth without relying on exports. 
The government has embarked this rebalancing exercise on to keep the economy on a 
sustained high growth path. The concern is that the capacity created by the continued 
rapid investment could potentially lead to declining prices and profits and spark 
another round of bank loan defaults, or the needed continued expansion in 
international market share, given that domestic consumption is not rising fast enough, 
could run up against stiffer price competition or rising protectionist pressures, 
especially if the global economy slows at the same time.  In India, the concern is that 
infrastructure bottlenecks could slowdown growth or prevent it from increasing. 
Given the size of such infrastructure needs, it is likely that private sector financing 
will be needed such that the cost of long-term capital has to come down further. While 
the model here does not differentiate between different capital types, it shows that 
investment in India is lower than optimal (again defined with respect to the model). If 
India is to raise its investment rate, cost of capital needs to be lowered through greater 
efficiency gains in financial intermediation. This calls for further liberalization of the 
financial sector. In contrast and in what might be termed as a return to economic 
fundamentalism, this paper asks the question: how far can the neoclassical growth 
model be used to explain China and India’s growth? Why is this question important?  
The neoclassical model provides a framework where the explanatory power of any 
particular factor can be quantitatively assessed and compared across other countries in 
a general equilibrium environment (unlike most econometrics-based studies), and 
because policies developed in this framework are  among the most researched in the 
literature and thus their implications better understood. 
 
2.  China and India’s Recent Growth Experience 
 
Since the 1990s, China’s real growth rate has averaged around 9 percent while that of 
India around 6 percent. India, however, went through a balance of payments crisis in 
1992-93 and in recent years its growth rate has edged up closer to that of China’s. 
Indeed, by some measures the growth drivers also appear to be very similar. Since   5
1990, growth in both China and India has been driven by rapid investment. The 
investment-to-GDP ratio in China increased by 8.2 percentage points between 2000-
2005, while that in India by 9.8 percentage points. Against this rise in investment, in 
both China and India private and government consumption fell. In China, private 
consumption-to-GDP ratio fell by nearly 12.2 percentage points, while in India by 
10.8 percentage points. The large difference is in net exports. In China net exports 
rose by 5.8 percentage points of GDP, while in India by 2.4 percentage points.  
 




Notwithstanding these similarities, these variables in levels are very different between 
the two economies.  By 2005, China’s gross investment-to-GDP ratio had reached 43 
percent, while that of India’s was around 30 percent. Private consumption’s share in 
GDP in China had fallen to 38 percent—one of the lowest in the world, while that in 
India was around 58 percent.   
 
Figure 2:  Changes in GDP Components: 1990-2005  
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3.  China and India’s Economy as a Neoclassical Growth Model 
 
Against this background, this paper asks the question whether the standard one-sector 
neoclassical growth model can explain the behavior of macroeconomic variables in 
China and India. The answer should be no. The exercise, however, should serve as a 
benchmark and helps to understand the specific ways in which the two economies 
deviate from the standard model and thus help to pin down the market structure, 
institutions, and policies that may have been important.  
 
In this one-sector economy, a representative household lives infinitely in a world of 
certainty, each period choosing consumption and investment to maximize lifetime 
utility. As is customary, households own capital and rent it out to firms and, in turn, 
own these firms. 
 
Typically, in such models, the household also chooses its working hours, and for 
industrial countries, this choice typically turns out to be important. In the case of both 
China and India, data on hours worked is hard to come by and although the 
International Labor Organization has some survey information, it is patchy and covers 
only a few manufacturing industries. Acknowledging this drawback of the model, we 
drop labor choice from the household’s maximization problem. This simplifies the 
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subject to the budget constraint: 
 
 
t tt t t t t Nc X w rK + ≤+ + Π  (1) 
 
where N is the size of working-age population, c is per capita consumption
C
N
, X is 
investment, K is capital, and Π is total transfers (including government transfers net of 
taxes and corporate profits). There are two relative prices—w the real wage rate and r 
the real return from renting capital.  
 




α α − , where Y is aggregate output, A measures the level of total 
factor productivity (TFP), and L is the number of workers employed. Using these 
notations, the firm’s problem is to maximize profit given by 
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There are two feasibility constraints in this model economy, which are the national 
income identity:  
 
  tt t t CXGY + +=  (3) 
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where G is government purchases, and the law of capital accumulation given by:  
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Where δ is the depreciation rate. To derive the policy functions and the steady-state of 
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Using these notations, one arrives at: 
 
  Aggregate production function: 
1
tt yk e
α α − =  (5) 
 
 
  Marginal product of capital:
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tt t rk e
α α α
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  Marginal product of labor: 
1 (1 ) tt t wk e
α α α
− =−  (7) 
 
 
 Resource  constraint:  111(1 ) (1 ) tt t t t t t cn k k g y γ δ +++ + −− =−  (8) 
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 (10) 
 
where, t λ , is the multiplier associated with the household’s budget constraint. The 
solutions to (9) and (10) constitute equilibrium for this economy.   8
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where the variables with subscript “s” denote their respective steady-state levels.  In 








α α − = , is the efficiency wedge, while the sequence of { } t g is the 
government wedge. 
 
4.  Calibrating the Growth Model 
 
For both China and India, GNP and its components are constructed using official 
expenditure side data.
2 Turning to the parameters of the growth model, we assume 
that α = 0.35, as is standard. The share of labor income in both China’s and India’s 
                                                 
2 For details on how the China expenditure side data is constructed see Barnett and Brooks (2006); 
Aziz (2006); and Aziz and Cui (2007).     9
national income is less than 0.65 and this is also the case in several other countries 
especially in the many of the fast-growing Asian economies. However, weak 
statistical coverage and institutional factors—such as high markups enjoyed by 
firms—are often cited as the causes. As a recent study shows, in most countries once 
such data issues are accounted for, the share of labor is around two-thirds (Gollin, 
2002). Acknowledging this weakness and noting that statistical adjustments as 




For China, the capital stock series is constructed using the perpetual inventory 
method. Real gross fixed domestic investment is augmented with the real current 
account deficit or surplus to arrive at gross national investment, which is then used to 
construct the capital stock series. The initial capital stock for 1979 is chosen to be 
such that the capital-output ratio is 2.1 as in Nehru, Swanson, and Dubey (2002), who 
used PPP-adjusted national accounts. The depreciation rate was chosen to be 0.06 
using available breakdown between in fixed asset investment and assuming that 
structures last for 25 years and equipment for 10 years. In the case of India, the 
official capital stock series is used (and augmented using investment data beyond 
2003), which has an implied average depreciation rate of around 4 percent possibly 
reflecting the larger share of equipment investment. Data on employment is taken 
from published labor statistics and includes employment in the agricultural sector for 
both China and India. The share of employment, e, is derived by deflating total 
employment by the working-age population, as is standard.  
 
Figure 4:  China and India: Labour Productivity 
 































































                                                 
3  Interestingly, studies that have estimated production functions directly for China such as Chow 
(1993), Chow and Li (2002), and Heytens and Zebregs (2002), have found similar values for 
capital’s share in national income.  In the case of India,    10


































































Using the calibrated parameters as a starting point, we first derive the sequence of the 
technology parameter,{ } t A . As can be seen from the above figure, much of the 
China’s remarkable increase in labor productivity since the 1980s has been due to 
efficiency gains with substantial contribution from rising capital per worker. On the 
other hand, the capital-output ratio, after falling through the 1980s, rose sharply in the 
late-1980s and early 1990s before contracting by the mid-1990s. Since then it has 
risen steadily. While differing in absolute levels, the story is very similar in the case 
of India. Increases in labor productivity, especially in recent years have been due to 
significant improvement in efficiency and in capital use per worker.  In both 
countries, but especially in China the contribution of labor to growth has been 
remarkably small. Some of his could be due to poor quality of labor statistics, such 
that the efficiency gains may be overstated.  
 
5.  Simulating the Solow Growth Model 
 
The model is next simulated for the period 1980–2005. The sequence of technological 
shocks is treated as exogenous with {}
2004
1980 t t A
=  set equal to its derived value in the 
growth accounting exercise of the previous section, while from 2004 onwards the 
growth rate in TFP is set equal to its average over 1990–2004. The discount factor 
β =0.97, such that the long-term real interest rate is around 3 percent. As discussed 
earlier, α =0.35 and the initial stock of capital set at its derived value in 1979 K % . The 
simulation is carried out using the “shooting algorithm” discussed in Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002) such that the economy reaches a balanced growth path by 2015. The 
algorithm requires simulating equations (9) and (10) forward for a given initial level 
of consumption and then solving for this initial level such that the economy is in a 
steady state in 2015 and beyond. Changing the terminal date does not affect the 
results. 
   11
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In the case of both China and India, the standard Solow model fails to mimic the 
actual data. With { } t A as the only exogenous shock, the simulated output path closely 
traces the actual path until around the late 1980s, after which they deviate and the 
former ends up about 17-18 percent below the latter by 2005. Consumption’s share of 
GNP is much higher than in the data (nearly 20 percentage points), while the 
investment-to-GNP ratio is that much lower. As a result, the capital-output ratio does 
not increase as much as it does in the data and labor productivity is lower. This in a 
sense underlies the current concern over China’s growth pattern, namely, “too much” 
dependence on investment and too little on consumption. Put differently, Chinese 
consumers are not consuming as much as the high growth rate of the economy would 
imply. 
 
Adding the government wedge improves the model’s fit somewhat. The sequence of 
government consumption {}
2004
1980 t t g
= , is set equal to its value in the data derived above 
and is assumed to remain at its 1990–2005 average level beyond 2005. Simulated 
output is 15 percent lower than the actual by 2005. Consumption as a share of GNP is 
still higher than in the data, but the gap closes to around 15 percentage points.  
 




































































































































In the case of India, the model fails more spectacularly even after adding the 
government wedge. By 2005, simulated GNP is about 15 percent higher and through 
out the simulation period, simulated consumption is lower and investment higher than 
in the data. However, the model begins to better track the data in later years. Initially, 
simulated consumption is about 25 percentage points of GDP lower than in the data, 
but the gap narrows to around 5 percentage points of GDP by 2005. However, the 
continuous higher simulated investment results in the modeled capital-output ratio to 
be close to 3 as against 2.4 in the data by 2005.    13
6.  Investment Wedge 
 
An investment wedge is introduced in the model in the form of a time-varying tax on 
gross capital income, t τ  following (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004), Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002)). As a result, the household’s budget constraint changes to:  
 
  (1 )
t ttt t t t CXw r K τ + ≤+ − + Π  (11) 
 
and the intertemporal equilibrium condition becomes:  
 















=− + −  (12) 
 
As can be easily seen from equation (12), the investment wedge is essentially the 
difference between the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in consumption 
(given the log utility function, this is just the growth rate of consumption) and the 
marginal product of capital. The sequence of investment wedge {}
2004
1980 t τ  is computed 
using the growth rate of real consumption in the data, the derived sequence of capital 
stock {}
2004
1980 t k and the calibrated parameters, β  and δ .  
 
Figure 9:  China: Derived Investment Wedge (in percent) 
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Figure 10: India: Derived Investment Wedge (in percent) 
 





























































The result is striking. Virtually all through the last two decades, the investment wedge 
in China has been negative. (The sharp increase in capital income tax in 1988 is an 
artifact of the way the wedge has been constructed and is due to a significant fall in 
real consumption growth in a year of very high inflation.) While in the 1980s the 
wedge, on average, was positive at around 9 percent, it turned negative in the 1990s to 
around 25 percent, before easing modestly to 15 percent in the 2000s. In terms of 
return to capital, while in the 1980s, the wedge reduced the return on capital by 2.6 
percentage points, while it added, in the 1990s and 2000s, 3.1 and 2.2 percentage 
points, respectively.  
 
This is in sharp contrast to the investment wedge in India, where it has been positive 
through out the simulation period. However, after falling sharply between 1993-95 the 
period of immediately following the balance of payments crisis when India embarked 
on substantial opening of the economy and liberalization of its financial sector, the 
wedge increased in the late 1990s before coming down again since 2002. The positive 
investment wedge found in India is similar to that derived for other countries, 
including Mexico, Chile, and Japan. In these countries, the wedge is positive, 
reflecting not only high income tax rates, but also a variety of frictions that increase 
the cost of capital, although they are not explicitly captured in the sparse environment 
of the one-sector Solow growth model. In Japan, this wedge is broadly equivalent to 
the effective marginal income tax rate (Hayashi and Prescott (2002)), while in Mexico 
and Chile the wedges are greater than the effective tax rates suggesting other 
significant costs of capital (Bergoeing and others (2002)).    15
Figure 11:  China: Simulation with Efficiency,  



































































































































Once the investment wedge is included in the simulation, the gap between the 
simulated and actual data is virtually closed in the case of China. Comparing the gap 
when only the efficiency and government wedges were used, the cumulative effects of 
the investment wedge explains about 12-13 percent of 2005 GNP, and lowers the 
consumption-to-GNP ratio (increases the investment-to-GDP ratio) by 12-13 
percentage points. These are large numbers and they underscore the role played by the 
distortion to the cost of capital in inducing such large investment rates. Put 
differently, one can construct a counterfactual scenario where an economy identical to 
China, except for a zero investment wedge, would reach a level of GNP in 2004, 
which is 5 percent lower than China’s actual output, but with consumption’s share of 
GNP 13 percentage points higher or investment’s share about 13 percentage points 
lower.  
 
In the case of India, similar results hold. The investment wedge explains about 13-14 
percent of 2005 GNP, increases consumption-to-GNP share by 5 percentage points 
and lowers that of investment by the same amount. Although for earlier years the fit is 
not as good, the distortion explains about 17 percentage points of the lower 
investment-to-GDP (higher consumption-to-GDP) in the data. While the results are 
not as dramatic for the later years as is the case in China, the investment wedge is a 
significant explanatory variable. To be sure, much of the rise in investment-to-GDP 
ratio in the later years appear to be driven by the higher efficiency gains, such that 
much less was left for the decline in the investment wedge to explain. In contrast, the 
efficiency gains in the later years could not explain a large part of the rise in 
investment in China.   16
Figure 12:  India: Simulation with Efficiency,  
Government and Investment Wedges 



































































































































7.  Interpreting Investment Wedges as Financial frictions 
 
China’s Nonperforming Loans 
 
In the case of China, as shown in Aziz (2006) these wedges can be interpreted as 
financial frictions brought about by state-owned banks in China tolerating large non-
performing loans that were later (from 1999-2006) recapitalized with government 
funds.
4  To see how this would happen, suppose the “average” or representative firm 
in China is one that faces a lower cost of capital because it can default on part of its 
loan without facing sanctions. Let  t μ be the proportion of loans that a firm does not 
repay, either because the firm does not fear effective punitive actions or the banks 
have been implicitly allowed to do so (what is generally called “legacy” loans) under 
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4 In addition, (Anderson (2006); Lardy (1998); Karacadeg (2003); and Dobson and Kashyap (2006) 
among other provide descriptions of how nonperforming loans were accumulated in China’s banking 
system.    17
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which is the same as equation (12).  
 
The household’s budget constraint becomes  ˆˆ (1 )
t tt t t t t t cxw e r k τ π + ≤+ − + , where 
ˆˆ tt t t t rk π πτ =− . As a result, the two economies—the one with the investment wedge 





































when there is no 
distortion. As is easily evident a higher τ ) leads to a higher capital stock in the steady 
state.   
 
The question, of course, is whether this effect was large enough to matter at the 
macroeconomic level. Based on official estimates, the stock of NPLs that was created 
in the last 10-15 years would, at the end of 2004 amount to around 26 percent of 
GNP. In addition, banks in China also carry “special mention” loans, which are loans 
that are not being fully serviced at present, but for legal reasons or because the 
corporate client is undergoing restructuring, they are not classified as nonperforming. 
It is possible that some or substantial portion of these loans could turn out to be 
nonperforming. The fourth large bank, Agricultural Bank of China, is the second 
largest in terms of deposits and is still without a formal restructuring plan. It is 
possible that when such a plan is put in place the bank’s recorded NPLs will increase. 
In the prototype economy with the investment wedge, the accumulated stock of net 
negative wedge at the end of 2004 stood at around 60 percent of 2004 GNP (assuming 
a zero starting stock in 1990). However, it is typically the case that there is a time lag 
between when a loan becomes nonperforming in the economic sense and when it gets 
classified as such in the accounting sense. If this time lag were about two years, which 
is not atypical of Chinese banking practice, then the reported NPLs in 2004 would be 
reflecting NPLs created in 2002. 
   18
Figure 13:  China: Official Estimates of NPLs Created (end-2004)  
(in billions of renminbi) 
 
Reported NPLs on balance sheet 1575
NPLs transferred to AMCs 1770
      Original transfer in 1999-2000 1420
      Additional BOC and CCB transfer 350
Write-offs 324
Total  3668
(In percent of 2004 GNP) 25.8
Special mention loans  1140
(In percent of 2004 GNP) 8.0  
 
Figure 14:  Derived Cumulative Capital Income Wedge (in percent of 2004 GNP) 
 
Derived Cumulative Capital Income Wedge











































Figure 15:  China: Average Effective Tax Rate (in percent) 
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Taking into account the time lag in reporting, the 2002 negative wedge in terms of the 
2004 GNP of the prototype economy stands at around 46  percent. However, one 
needs to add to this capital income tax received by the government. In China, the flat 
income tax rate is currently 33 percent for domestic firms and 15 percent for foreign 
firms. However, the effective average income tax rate has been around 4-5 percent 
(on gross capital income), on average, since the early 1990s, and is around 6-7 
percent.
5 This reflects a wide range of general and specific concessions awarded to 
firms. Using the above corporate tax rates and adding the derived capital income tax 
to the net wedge raises the gross wedge that would be reported in 2004 in the 
prototype economy to around 48 percent of GNP. This is still higher than the created 
NPLs reported by Chinese banks, but closer to estimates by outside analysts such as 
Anderson (2006). While an exact mapping of the reported NPLs and the model-based 
wedges cannot be established, it is clear that NPLs may have been a major conduit 
through which investment was supported and that the wedge derived from the Solow 
growth model is not unrealistic. 
 
Borrowing Constraints and Bank Reform in China 
 
However, in the last few years significant progress has been made in reforming 
China’s banking sector. And although it may be too early to evaluate the impact of 
these reforms on bank behavior (Podpiera, 2006), it appears that at least the three big 
banks (BOC, CCB, and ICBC) may have put in place internal controls which could 
have potentially slowed the creation of new NPLs. Yet the estimated investment 
wedge appears to have increased in the last few years, although, on average, it is 
lower than in the 1990s.  
 









1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Households Enterprises  
Government
China: Domestic Savings by Sectors 
(In percent of GNP)
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China, and author's estimates.
 
 
                                                 
5 The rate is somewhat higher around 9-10 percent on capital income net of depreciation. Note that 
these are the average effective tax rates, and not the marginal tax rates. Given the lack of adequate 
information, it is difficult to compute the marginal rate. In addition, data on capital income tax is 
available only from 1992 as published in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook, prior to this period 
separate income tax data is not available.   20
To address this issue, one needs to look into a particularly striking feature of the 
Chinese economy, namely, that corporate savings is the largest source of financing 
investment. A cursory look at the breakdown of savings across sectors shows that 
while household savings has fallen from around 21 percent of GDP in the early 1990s 
to 19 percent of GDP in 2004, corporate and government savings, on the other hand, 
has steadily increased. In fact, during the past five years, enterprise and government 
saving each rose by around 4 percentage points of GDP, and they now represent 
around 19 and 10 percent of GDP, respectively.  
 
The dominance of internal savings in financing investment is in a large part due to the 
structure of firm ownership and China’s poor financial intermediation, i.e., due to an 
underdeveloped banking system, which has been unable to meet the investment needs, 
particularly of the vast number of small and medium-scale enterprises, many of whom 
are in the private sector. Surveys and studies show that the private Chinese firms are 
constrained in their access to credit. Such constraints reflect the lending practices and 
regulatory framework that favor the state-owned enterprises over the private firms 
(Huang (2003)), the lengthy bank restructuring since the late 1990s, which 
discouraged lending until recently, and the underdeveloped bond and equity markets, 
which provide few channels of indirect financing. Indeed, according to the business 
environment survey conducted by the World Bank, the share of Chinese firms that 
complain about access to financing as a key obstacle to their business is significantly 
higher than other East Asian economies. The smaller the firms, the more constrained 
they are.
6 This of course does not preclude many other firms, especially the large 
SOEs, from borrowing from banks without facing any constraints. Aziz (2006) shows 
that characterizing the representative firm as being credit constrained leads to a 
distortion that is quantitatively large enough to explain the observed aggregate 
behavior of consumption and investment.  
 
To illustrate the nature of this problem, assume that due to firms’ limited commitment 
households (or banks) are not willing to lend without collateral and the capital owned 
by entrepreneurs (the owners of firms) can only be used for this purpose. However, in 
the presence of the borrowing constraint, a firm’s return to saving an additional unit 
of capital is not only the marginal product of capital it receives next period but also 
the “return” from loosening the borrowing constraint. Thus, the return to internal 
savings of entrepreneurs is higher than the marginal product of capital as long as the 
borrowing constraint is binding, and this could lead to higher accumulation of capital 
than otherwise. The detailed microeconomic environment where such borrowing 
constraints appear as optimal arrangements is not discussed in Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).  
 
Assume that wages are paid in advance of production each period and therefore firms 
need to borrow funds to do so. Since there is no uncertainty in the model, the setup is 
difficult to justify and should be seen only as a device to introduce the use of working 
capital. In particular, it is also assumed that all working capital is borrowed and all 
investment is undertaken from internal savings of firms. This is clearly an extreme 
                                                 
6  The World Bank survey taken in 1999 showed that 80 percent of private firms face financial 
constraints in China, and Chinese firms’ reliance on retained earnings is higher than in other 
countries.    21
assumption as firms borrow both for working capital and for investment purposes. 
The assumption, however, keeps the model simple and helps to highlight the issue.  
 
The household’s budget constraint: changes to  11 1 tt t t tt t t tt cn l l w e r l γ π ++ + + −≤ + + , 
where  t l  is the household’s savings. Firms maximize  
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( ) 1 tt t t t rw e k θ +≤  
 
As noted earlier, wages need to be paid before production so that firms need to 
borrow  tt we. However, the funds that a firm can borrow are subject to a collateral 
constraint. The only collateral is the capital the firm owns. And this is the key 
institutional set up that drives the result. In other papers that have used a similar set up, 
such as Chakraborty (2005) and Kobayashi and Inaba (2005) in the case of Japan 
during the 1990s, the collateral is either land or equity, both of which are difficult to 
pledge as collateral given China’s private property rules. In addition, until 2006-07 
the stock market was not a significant source of financing. How representative is this 
stylization of the Chinese economy? Using the World Bank survey of firms, Aziz and 
Cui (2007) show that 40 percent of all firms and 80 percent of privately owned firms 
are financially constrained in meeting their working capital needs and that this 
constraint adversely affects the number of workers firms employ. The average 
employment growth for firms that are not financially constrained is about 5.5 percent 
annually, while in firms that reported facing financial constraints employment growth 
was less than 0.8 percent per year. In contrast, financial constraint had no impact on 
firm investment, i.e., the investment growth was statistically the same for firms that 
were financial constrained and those that were are not. This evidence and the fact that 
neither land nor equity can be pledged as collateral given China’s private property 
rules (only after the 2007 reforms is urban land treated as private property) suggests 
that assuming that firm capital is the only source of collateral is not an unrealistic 
stylized representation. Banks lend to firms such that its debt service, ( ) 1 tt t rw e + , 
does not exceed, 0 1 t θ << , fraction of the firm’s capital stock.   
 
After some substitutions, when the borrowing constraint is binding the equilibrium 
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Comparing this steady state with that of the standard model, it is clear that capital will 
be higher as long as  s θ  is appropriately small.   
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which is equivalent to equation (12) and the borrowing constraint looks identical to an 
investment wedge. This wedge will be positive, i.e., the implicit rate of return to 
capital will be higher than in the standard model as the borrowing constraint is 
binding. To see this note that when the borrowing constraint is binding 
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> 0.  
 
Consequently, the equilibrium of such an economy will look the same as one where 
there is negative tax on capital income equivalent to ˆ τ . In a period when banks are 
restructuring, such as in recent years in China, banks become more cautious about 
their lending. This intensified the borrowing constraints faced by firms, increasing the 
returns from loosening the constraint and encouraging firms to increase internal 
savings.  
 
Figure 17:  Short Term Bank Loan to Capital Ratio 
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It is difficult to pin down the value of   t θ  from Chinese banking data as working 
capital is not separately recorded. While prudential norms related to maximum loan-
to-value ratios exist, it is unclear how extensively these have been implemented and to 
what extent they have been binding. Approximating working capital as short-term 
loans (less than one-year maturity) less trade credits, data from 1999-2005 reveals that 
the ratio of such loans to capital stock has been declining and on average over this 
period the ratio stood around 0.25.  For simulation purposes, two experiments were 
conducted. In the first,  t θ  was set to 0.25 for the entire period 1980–2004, and in the 
second experiment it was raised to 0.4 for 1980–1989 and lowered to 0.25 from 1990–
2004. 
 
Figure 18:  China: Simulation with Borrowing Constraint  




































































































































































































































































With 0.25 t θ = for the entire period, the simulated consumption and investment path 
tracked well the data for the period 1990-2004, but did  rather poorly in the 1980s, 
when simulated consumption was too low and investment too high compared to the 
data. This suggests that the borrowing constraint may not have been that severe in the 
1980s. Easing the constraint by increasing  t θ  to 0.4 in the 1980s improves the fit of 
the simulation better (Figure 18.). Indeed, for this path of { } t θ  the  simulated 
consumption and investment path tracks the data on consumption and investment 
quite well. However, the implied path for output tracks the data less well. By 2005, 
simulated GNP is about 10 percent below that in the data. In the absence of firm 
evidence on  t θ , it is difficult to ascertain the contribution of this factor. What the   24
exercise shows is that such borrowing constraints can potentially explain some part of 
the consumption-investment comovement in the Chinese data and that it is possible 
that the recent bank reforms have led to a tightening of the constraint that may have 
induced higher internal savings by firms. 
 
Self-Insurance Against Administrative Controls 
 
Another reason why firms have been increasing internal saving may have to do with 
the way government has tended to guide lending. While government has steadily 
removed itself from intervening directly in the economy, one of the indirect ways it 
has retained its intervention is by guiding lending to specific sectors depending on 
what it has viewed as being priority areas for investment. Much of this has been on 
allocating resources sectorally, but to some extent this practice has also been a tool to 
control overall investment. In general, the government has tried to control investment 
from going to sectors with overcapacity through administrative orders. Depending on 
its reading of the economic situation, the government has made changes to the sectors 
in the guidance list. While the objective of this guidance has been to influence the 
sectoral allocation of investment funds, the practice may have had a general impact on 
firm behavior. Given that the government could change the status of a sector in the 
guidance list, all firms are faced with uncertainty over whether banks would provide 
loans or not. As this type of uncertainty is uninsurable, firms have sought to self 
insure through retaining profits as internal savings, and a rise in this uncertainty 
would lead to high corporate savings.  
 
To see the impact of such government policy more clearly, the standard model is 
altered in the following way. At the end of each period, a firm applies to a bank for a 
loan. Bank loans are in the form of contracts that specify the interest rate and the 
amount, i.e., { } , tt rx . With probability  t ε  the loan is approved and with probability 
1 t ε −  the loan is rejected. If the loan is rejected, the firm carries out production only 
with the capital stock it owns, otherwise it borrows the amount that it needs. Labor 
decisions by the firm are taken before the loan is approved. This assumption is needed 
to make the loan approval matter in equilibrium. To see this suppose a firm decides on 
its hiring decision after the bank loan is approved. In this case, firms with higher 
capital will hire more workers than firms with lower capital. Given that the 
technology follows constant returns to scale, aggregate output will not be affected by 
this contractual change. As government policy in China is used to channel funds to 
certain sectors and away from others, the probability of approval is sector-specific 
with some sectors facing a lower probability of rejection than others. However, to 
keep the analysis tractable here, it is assumed that all firms face the same risk and  t π  
is drawn independently each period, i.e., it is the risk faced by the representative firm. 
The firm’s problem now becomes: 
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subject to  0 t x >  with probability  t ε  and  0 t x =  with probability1 t ε − . 
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ρ =  be the share of firms’ own capital to total 
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This is again equivalent to equation (12). This expression for ˆt τ  is strictly positive as 
long as 0 1 t ε <<  and  0 1 t ρ <<  and thus  ˆt τ appears as a negative tax, raising the 
return on internal savings by firms above the marginal product of capital because of 
its self-insurance value. In addition, as  t ε  falls, i.e., the probability of being credit 
constrained increases, the wedge,  ˆt τ , also increases. This provides greater incentive to 
save. While China’s state planning commission (NDRC) lists industries that are not in 
a priority sector or where there maybe overcapacity to banks and this list changes over 
time, it is difficult to use this information to estimate { } t ε . Although quantitative 
estimates are difficult to come by, it is possible that this factor also played a 
significant role in the rise in China’s corporate savings in recent years.   
 
Financial Sector Reforms in India 
 
Turning to India, as the investment wedge is positive and large, a natural place to start 
is with capital income tax. As in China, the statutory capital income tax rate is high—
40 percent in earlier years and 35 percent in later years. However, the average 
effective tax rate is not. As shown in Poirson (2006) the average effective tax rate in 
the 1990s and the early 2000s was around 5.2 percent. (Data limitations prevent 
extending the effective rate calculation beyond 2003). While the marginal tax rate is 
likely to be higher, typically 1½ -2 times that of the average rate, it is unlikely to be a 
big explanatory variable given that the investment wedge averaged around 25 percent 
fluctuating between 40-10 percent. 
 
This brings up financial sector reforms as a candidate explanation. In the case of 
China, financial repression in the form of high tolerance for nonperforming loans and 
the use of firm capital as collateral for bank financing depressed the effective cost of 
capital, thereby leading to overinvestment (compared to the level predicted by the 
standard Solow growth model). In the case of India, financial repression in the form 
of preemption of loanable funds by the state to finance its deficits and over regulation 
of the banking sector and capital markets kept the cost of capital for the private sector 
at elevated levels until recent reforms. While financial sector reforms began in 1985, 
quantitative controls on bank loans remained strong with high reserve ratio (CRR) and 
statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), the latter used as a tool for captive fiscal deficit 
financing. By 1991, the CRR (15.5 percent) and SLR (38.5 percent) together 
preempted more than half of bank deposits. Since 1992, as part of a wider reform   26
package in response to the balance of payments crisis, wide-ranging banking and 
capital market reforms have been implemented. 
 
Figure 19:  Effective Gross Capital Income Tax Rate (in percent) 
 





































































Figure 20:  India: CRR and SLR (in percent of deposit) 
 
India: CRR and SLR
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These reforms are well described in several papers including (Bery and Singh (2005); 
Singh (2004); Panagariya (2005); Mohan (2006)). No attempt is made here to 
exhaustively list them, instead some of the main ones are pointed out. Clearly among 
the most important was the end of administered interest rates.
7 As a result of these 
                                                 
7 Only the rate on savings deposit and that on interest charged on export credits are controlled by the 
Reserve Bank of India. In addition, banks are not allowed to exceed their declared prime rate for 
small loans. There are caps on margins for foreign borrowing and deposits from non-resident 
Indians.    27
changes, both deposit rates and lending rates have on average fallen since 1992. At 
the same time, both the CRR and the SLR were cut significantly, although the SLR 
remains around 25 percent. In addition, entry and branch expansion requirements for 
domestic private banks were eased and from 2003 for foreign banks. Moreover, 
prudential norms were rationalized and public sector banks recapitalized both through 
the budget and the market. Alongside banking reforms, the government also 
undertook major capital market changes, in particular through the repealing of the 
1947 Capital Issues Act and the enactment of the SEBI Act of 1992 that paved the 
way firms to raise capital through fully market-determined rates. Subsequent laws 
expanded the use of credit derivatives and in 1999 the ban on forward trading was 
lifted. In addition, the stock exchanges were modernized and demutualized, while 
payments systems were upgraded. Importantly, bankruptcy and insolvency procedures 
were liberalized in 2002.  
 
While these infrastructural reforms were lowering financial intermediation costs, a 
more market-oriented management of public debt also improved the efficiency of the 
financial system. Abandoning a long tradition, in 1992 the government began issuing 
debt at market-determined interest rates and in 1997 abolished automatic monetization 
of fiscal deficit through the issuance of treasury bills. This expanded the set of debt 
instruments very rapidly, as well as hedging tools such as interest swaps, forward and 
futures trading. The management of market liquidity was also made more efficient 
through the establishment of the repo market. While it is difficult to match the impact 
of these changes with the derived investment wedge, it is clear that the wedge, after 
remaining virtually constant through the 1980s, fell sharply after the first round of 
reforms in 1992 and then in the 2000s.  Compared to China, nonperforming loans 
were not a major problem in India, and while their reduction and the recapitalization 
of state-owned banks may have been helpful, they are unlikely to be major driver of 
the investment wedge. 
 
This brings us to the role of borrowing constraints. Several firm-level studies have 
pointed to access to external finance as a major factor determining the growth of firms 
in India (Allen et al., 2006; Ghosh, 2006; Oura and Kohli, 2008). While there are 
tentative similarities between China and India in the rise in internal savings as a 
source of financing this s unlikely to be driven by a tightening in borrowing 
constraints in India. Recall that in China, firms responded to the tightening of 
borrowing constraints by increasing savings as that was the only source of collateral 
for bank loans. This is not the case in India given the vastly better developed private 
property rights and even if that were to be the case the rise in internal savings has so 
far been rather modest. Instead in the case of India, borrowing constraints were likely 
to have been eased by the financial sector reforms.  
 
While it is difficult to quantitatively calibrate any particular reform, the changes in the 
CRR and SLR rates could provide some quantifiable measure of how important 
financial reforms were. A relatively simple way of incorporating these reserve 
requirements is to assume that all household savings takes the form of deposits in a 
representative bank. The bank takes deposits from households,  t l , and gives out t ρ  as 
the deposit interest rate in return, while charging  t r  as the lending rate to firms. The 
government preempts t σ fraction of the deposits. The deposits preempted by the   28
government, tt l σ , is transferred to households in a lump sum manner.
8 The  firm 
borrows ( ) 1 tt l σ −  and converts it into capital  ( ) 1 tt t kl σ =−  and pays ( )( ) 1 tt t rl δσ −− 
at the end of production to the bank. The bank’s profit is given by 
( )( ) 1 tt t t t rl l δ σρ −−− , that under zero profit condition, implies that   
() () 1 tt t r ρ σδ =− − .  
 
Figure 21:  India: Domestic Savings (in percent of GDP) 
 
India: Domestic Savings


































































The household’s budget constraint is  ( )( ) 11 1 1 tt t t t t t t t tt cn l l w e r l γ σδ π ++ + + −= +− − + 
and the economy’s resource constraint is 
( ) ( ) 111 11 1 1 1 tt t t t t t t tt t t t cn k k y ln l γδ π σ γ σ +++ ++ + + +− − = − + − . Previously, the net transfers 
on the household were the taxes needed to finance government’s expenditures  t g . 
Here  11 1 1 ttt t t t t t g ln l π σγ σ ++ + + =+ − . Thus depending on the sign of  11 1 1 tt t t t t ln l σ γσ ++ + + − , 
the taxes needed to finance government expenditure could be smaller or larger than 
before. In particular, if  1 t σ + is not lowered too much compared to  t σ , then 
11 1 10 tt t t t t ln l σ γσ ++ + + −>  and the needed tax for a given level of government spending 
will be less. This can be rewritten as 
( ) ( ) ( ) 111 11 1 1 11 tt t t t t t t tt t t t cn k k g yln l γδ σ γ σ +++ ++ + + +− − = − + − . It is not difficult to 
construct a more realistic but complicated setting where ( ) 11 1 1 tt t t t t ln l σγ σ ++ + + −  is 
equivalent to the government’s net purchase of bonds. As a result, 
t π  can be thought 
of as the part of government expenditure financed through taxes, with the remaining 
financed by net purchases of bonds that are partially or fully financed through the 
preempted deposits.  
 
Turning to the consumption function, it turns out that   
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which can be easily verified to be equivalent to (12) once more.  
 
























































































































































































































































Two separate simulations were carried out. In the first, the sequence of { } t σ was 
proxied by the actual SLR for the period 1980-2005 and then assumed to be fixed at 
the average 2000-2005 level. In the second simulation { } t σ was proxied by both SLR 
and CRR. As shown in Figure 22, the results are encouraging. Using only SLR, the 
model mimics the data significantly better than under the standard Solow model set 
up. While the model does much better in the later years, in the earlier years simulated 
consumption is still too low and investment too high. The results after adding CRR 
are much better. The gap between simulated and actual consumption and investment 
narrows markedly in the earlier years, while the fit in the latter years is preserved.    30























































































































































































































































8.  Conclusion 
 
The implication of the analysis in the previous sections is that financial distortions 
may be crucial in understanding China’s and India’s economic performances and that 
financial sector reform may turn out to be key in China’s quest to rebalance growth 
and India’s pursuit to raise its growth rate . This is not to suggest that other factors put 
forward in the other studies are not relevant. Rather the analysis suggests that the 
explanatory power of financial distortions may be quantitatively large and that 
focusing on reforming this sector may be quite important. Indeed, simulations based 
on the prototype economy discussed in the previous sections indicate that in the case 
of China if financial reforms were to remove these distortions—for example by 
raising the cost of capital to the effective capital income tax rate—the consumption-
to-GNP could rise from its current level of below 40 percent to around 55 percent in 
steady state, which would imply that the investment-to-GNP ratio would fall to 
around 30 percent from its current level of over 45 percent. In the simulation, the 
average growth rate of output would fall by around 2 percentage points below the 
average of the 1990s and 2000s to around 8 percent. Similarly in the case of India, 
reforms that lower the cost of capital to its average effective rate of capital income 
tax, would increase the investment-to-GDP ratio by another 5 percentage points over 
the medium term with 1-2 percentage points higher growth rate.
9 
                                                 
9 In simulating the impact of such reforms, it was assumed that financial sector restructuring cuts the 
wedge on capital income from its 2005 level to that of the average effective rate of capital income 
tax of the 1990s and 2000s. All other parameters were left unchanged.  
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Finally, a methodological issue: China’s sustained double-digit growth rate over the 
last 25 years and India’s rapid growth rate in the 2000s have, in a sense, surprised 
researchers, as they have been unprecedented. This has prompted many researchers to 
try to uncover the “China” or “India” model of development. What this paper suggests 
is that one need not look far beyond the neoclassical growth theory to uncover such a 
model. Many questions remain unanswered, such as what underlies the very high and 
sustained productivity growth?  Is it really just technological progress or are some 
important elements being missed? Do the results change if the external sector for both 
China and India are endogenized? These are important questions for future research. 
Nonetheless, neoclassical growth theory provides empirically reasonable answers to 
some key questions: China’s and India’s high growth rate may just be the result of 
adding or removing distortions in financial incentives.   33
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